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WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
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that an owner of property acquired a vested right to put his property to any use sanctioned by the zoning law in effect at the time he made an application for a permit. The
court has now renounced the majority rule and not merely created another exception.
In the Hull case, apparently the fact that the permit was issued before the new ordinance became effective was not important. In taking its stand contrary to the weight
of authority, the court said, "The more practical rule to administer, we feel, is that
the right vests when the party, property owner or not, applies for his building permit,
if that permit is thereafter issued." (Emphasis added.)
Charter Amendment of Municipal Corporation-Notice. In the case of Burns v.
Alderson, 51 Wn2d 810, 322 P2d 359 (1958), the validity of a Yakima election, in
which its city charter was amended by initiative, was challenged as being unconstitutional. The court decided (5 to 4) that the election results were void because the proponents of the charter amendment had failed to comply with the state constitutional
requirement in art. X, § 10, of giving voters thirty days notice of pending elections.
The principal differences of opinion revolved around the question of whether the constitutional requirement of notice was meant to apply to the initiative method of amending city charters or whether it was limited to methods existing at the time the constitutional provision was adopted. Under the majority view, the constitutional notice
was held a mandatory requirement applicable to methods unknown at the time the constitution was adopted.
The fact that the legislature stated, via the 1903 statute creating the initiative mode
of change, that it was to be a concurrent and additional method did no dissuade the
majority from their position. The court concluded that, although fifteen per cent of
the voters had signed a petition prior to the election, this was not compliance with the
thirty-day notice requirement of the constitution.
Four judges dissented, contending that, since the obvious purpose of the constitutional language was to insure notice to interested voters, the subsequently conceived
initiative method of amendment substantially accomplished this purpose. The dissenting view was that the substantive effect should have over-ridden the strict literal meaning given the constitution.

TAX
Excise Tax on Sale of Real Estate-Effect of Subsequent Rescission. In Perkins
v. King County, 51 Wn.2d 761, 321 P.2d 903 (1958), the Supreme Court of Washington
affirmed a dismissal by the Superior Court of King County of an action against King
County for the refund of an excise tax paid by the appellant. The tax was imposed
upon the execution of a contract of sale under which the appellant was to transfer
certain real estate to a purchaser. Subsequently, the parties to the contract of sale
made an agreement to rescind. Appellant then applied for a refund of the excise tax
on real estate sales which he had paid and was refused. He then brought an action
to recover.
The court, in affirming the lower court action, referred to the language of RCW
28.45.010, which states that "the term 'sale'... shall include ... any contract for...
conveyance... or transfer" of ownership or title to real property. The court then
reasoned that, since a contract of sale falls within the definition of the term "sale" in
RCW 28.45.010, it was a taxable event at the time it occurred. The court rejected the
appellant's contention that the operative effect of an agreement to rescind is to make
the contract void at its inception-in effect, as though it never happened.
The contract to rescind is a separate and distinct agreement between the parties,
under which each releases the other from further contract obligations under the
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original agreement. RESTATM-NT, CONTRACTS, § 406, points out that "an agreement
by the parties to a contract to rescind their contractual duties . . . discharges such
duties if the agreement is... based on sufficient consideration... ." (Emphasis
added.) Thus, in this type of situation the making of the original contract of sale is
the event upon which the excise tax is imposed.
Washington cases in accord with § 406 of the RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTs, include
McMillan v. Bancroft, 162 Wash. 175, 298 P. 460 (1931), and Carter v. Miller, 155
Wash. 14, 283 P. 470 (1929).
One might also ask whether there should not be a second excise tax upon the rescission agreement involved in the principal case. The statutory definition of a taxable
event found in RCW 28.45.010 includes the clause, "or other contract under which
possession of the property is given to the purchaser, or [to] any other person by his
direction... ." It should be noted that the shifting of possession as well as the making
of the contract is required for the creation of a taxable event. Thus, in a situation
similar to the principal case, where there is a rescission and also a shifting of possession, it might well be questioned whether the result is another taxable event within the
meaning of the statute.
Inheritance Tax-Cash Value of Insurance Policy Subject to Taxation. In deciding
In re Leuthold's Estate, 152 Wash. Dec. 250, 324 P.2d 1103 (1958), the Washington
court overruled a position formerly taken in In re Knight's Estate, 31 Wn.2d 813, 199
P.2d 89 (1948). The rule in Washington now is that the cash surrender value of a
life insurance policy is property, which, if bought with community funds, produces a
community interest in the cash surrender value in the non-insured spouse. It follows,
consequently, that upon the death of the non-insured spouse, this community interest
is property of his or her estate which is subject to an inheritance tax.
The facts of the Leuthold case are as follows: the wife died testate, predeceasing
her husband, upon whose life the community held six life insurance policies with cash
surrender value provisions. The state contended that the wife's death was a taxable
event because it passed her half of the community interest in the surrender value of the
policies to her legatees. The wife's executor, however, convinced the lower court that
the Knight rule ("the cash surrender value of a life insurance policy is not property
which passes by will or the statute of inheritance") should control. The supreme court,
upon the first hearing, reported in 150 Wash. Dec. 227, 310 P.2d 872 (1957), affirmed,
five to three. On rehearing, the court reversed its former position and overruled the
Knight case by a five-to-four decision, in which a judge who had not previously participated and the judge who had written the original majority opinion, voted to reverse
the earlier decision.

TORTS
Constitutional Taking and Constitutional Damaging-Wrongful
Activity by Municipal Corporation-Recovery Against Airport by
Adjacent Property Owners-Airspace Ownership. Ackerman v.
Port of Seattle' is the first case in Washington to consider the relative
rights of the owner of an airport, here a municipal corporation, and
the owners of property near the airport. Sixty-one owners of real

property situated near the Sea-Tac airport, which is owned and oper1152 Wash. Dec. 663, 329 P.2d 210 (1958).

